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This article considers the problems arising during the judicial review of the budgetary procedure in
the European Union. Matters such as the jurisdiction of the ECJ, the identity of the reviewable acts,
the standing of all applicants as well as the grounds of review are examined in detail. Some
problems of the budgetary procedure are also highlighted and there are some proposals aiming to
improve the current situation. 
Kurzfassung
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Stellung aller Prozeßbeteiligten sowie die Überprüfungsgründe. Dabei werden einige Probleme des
Haushaltsverfahrens aufgezeigt sowie Vorschläge zur Verbesserung der aktuellen Situation
gemacht.
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I. Introduction
The enactment of the European Union’s budget, otherwise known as the “Budgetary Procedure”, has
been seen as an inter-institutional dimension within the institutional framework of the European
Union (Craig, De Búrca, 1998, at 99). Given the complexity of this framework it is anticipated to
have conflicts between the various institutions. The inter-institutional nature of the Budgetary
Procedure makes it certain that there are conflicts within this procedure. The conflict for the control
over the budget is completely understandable, if someone considers the rights included in this power:
a) the right to create revenue, b) the right to authorize expenditure, c) the right to approve the budget
as a total and d) the right to control the implementation of the budget (Strasser, 1980, at 1). 
The Budgetary Procedure is described in Art. 272 [ex 203] of the EC Treaty and Art. 12-18 of the
Financial Regulation (OJ 1977, L 356/1). There are seven stages in this procedure.
First stage 
the Commission sets the maximum rate of increase in non compulsory expenditure 
Second stage 
the Commission adopts the preliminary draft budget 
Third stage 
the Council examines the preliminary draft budget (first reading of the Council) and it
establishes the draft budget, which is sent to the Parliament 
Fourth stage 
the Parliament examines the draft (first reading of the Parliament). If it makes no amendments
the budget is considered adopted. If it makes amendments, the draft budget is sent back to the
Council 
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the Council examines the amendments of the Parliament (second reading of the Council). If it
does not modify the draft any more the budget is considered to be adopted. If it modifies the
draft, this is sent once more to the Parliament 
Sixth stage 
the Parliament examines the amendments made by the Council (second reading of the
Parliament). It can modify provisions regarding the non compulsory expenditure 
Seventh stage 
the President of the Parliament declares that the budget has been adopted 
II. Institutional Conflicts about the Budget 
During the 1980s almost all the conflicts about the control over the Community Budget, despite their
intensity, were always resolved through political settlements. All cases that reached the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) were removed from the Register after political compromises (Case 48/81,
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission, not reported, Case 72/82, Council v Parliament, not
reported, Case 73/82, Council v Commission, not reported, Case 377/87, European Parliament v
Council, ECR [1988] 4017, Case 383/87, Commission v Council, ECR [1988] 4051). The major
actors in these conflicts were the Council, the Parliament and to a lesser extent the Commission. The
first two institutions constitute the “Budgetary Authority”, the authority which is responsible for the
Budgetary Procedure. 
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Their conflicts did not result in judicial review for two possible reasons, a legal and a political
(Advocate General Mancini in Case 34/86, Council v. Parliament, ECR [1986] 2155 at 2157, para 2).
The legal reason comprised two factors. The first was the Council’s awareness that the Budgetary
Procedure established by the EC Treaty was so complicated that the Council had to lay down an
internal code of rules in order to make this procedure operate more smoothly. The second factor was
the uncertainty, which existed till 1986, about the ECJ’s power under Art. 230 [ex 173] to review the
legality of acts of Parliament (Mancini, op. cit.). The political reason was based on the background of
the two institutions’ (Parliament and Council) involvement in the Budgetary Procedure. (Mancini, op.
cit.). That of the Parliament was based on the historically established role of parliamentary
institutions in determining budgets (see Trotabas, Cotteret, 1995, at 16-23 for more details) aiming at
the same time to intensify its requests for new legislative powers and more democracy in the
Community. That of the Council was based on the fact that it was the Member States, which gather
and place the Community’s own resources at the Community’s disposal. The Member States are
practically financing the Community, in the Council’s opinion, therefore the institution which
represented them (Council) is entitled to the greater share of decision making power over the budget
(Mancini, op. cit.). It has been noted that there was a discrepancy between the rhetoric and the
practice of the Member States which publicly encouraged the Parliament to become more involved in
all the decision making procedures of the Community but privately they took steps constraining the
Parliament’s greater ambitions (Wallace, 1986, at 266). 
In 1986 however, the Council challenged the Communities’ budget before the ECJ and for the first
time the ECJ actually delivered a judgement on this issue (Case 34/86, Council v Parliament, ECR
[1986] 2155). This initialized a long series of occasions where the ECJ was asked to rule on the
legality of the Communities’ and later the Union’s budget. 
The most important conflict between the Council and the Parliament concerns the interpretation of
the terms “compulsory and non compulsory expenditure”. This distinction in Community expenditure
is of vital importance (see Kapteyn, Verloren van Themmat, 1998, at 379-382 for more details).
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expenditure while the Parliament has the final say about non compulsory expenditure. These two
categories of expenditure are defined in Art. 272(4) [ex 203(4)] of the EC Treaty. The compulsory
expenditure is expenditure necessarily resulting from the Treaties or from acts adopted in accordance
therewith. The non compulsory expenditure is all the other expenditure of the Union. These
definitions are not satisfactory. The Parliament gave its own interpretation according to which only
expenditure to which a third party has a legal claim may be regarded as compulsory expenditure
(Dankert, 1983, at 705). The Council did not present a counter argument but it did not accept this
definition either. However, in their Joint Declaration of 1982 on the Community Budgetary procedure
(OJ 1982, C 194/1) the Council and the Parliament defined as compulsory expenditure the
Community’s legal obligations towards third parties, who may be either third countries or Member
States, individuals or corporations (Dankert, op. cit., at 707). This definition included for instance
expenditure about the Common Agricultural Policy or the administrative expenditure of the
institutions. In Art. 16 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 1988 on Budgetary Discipline and
Improvement of the Budgetary procedure (OJ 1988, L 185/33), the two institutions agreed to consider
the expenditure incurred for the Structural Operations and the policies with multiannual allocations
such as the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes and the research policies as non compulsory
expenditure (see Zangl, 1989, at 675-685, for more details). Also the operational expenditure for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy is non compulsory. Despite these arrangements, however, there
have still been differences of opinion about some expenditure. For instance the UK’s budgetary
rebate is considered by the Council as compulsory expenditure while the Parliament considers it as
non compulsory expenditure (Dankert, op. cit., at 708). 
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Another conflict, of a more procedural nature, concerns the interpretation of Art. 272(6), 272(8) and
272(9) [ex 203(6), 203(8) and 203(9)] of the EC Treaty. More specifically it involves the
interpretation of the majorities mentioned in these articles (Sopwith, 1980, at 323-324). These
majorities refer a) to the competence of the Parliament to amend or reject the modifications made by
the Council to the draft budget regarding non-compulsory expenditure (Art. 272(6) [ex 203(6)]), b)
the competence of the Parliament to participate to the increase of the maximum rate of
non-compulsory expenditure included in the budget (this amount is established initially by the
Commission and it may be amended by an agreement between the Council and the Parliament – Art.
272(9) [ex 203 (9)]), and c) the competence of the Parliament to reject the draft budget (Art. 272 (8)
[ex 203(8)]). With regard to the first two cases (paras 6 and 9 of Art. 272 [ex 203]), the wording of
the relevant provisions requires the majority of the Parliament’s Members and three fifths of the votes
cast. This generates the following dilemma: do both these limitations refer to the majority required
for the adoption of the Parliament’s decision or does the first limitation refer to the necessary quorum
and the second (regarding the three fifths) to the majority required for the adoption of the decision?
(Sopwith, op. cit., at 323). It is obvious that the first method of calculation requires much bigger
majorities than the second. Today the European Parliament has 626 members. If the first method is
accepted (both limitations refer to the majority required for the adoption of the Parliament’s decision)
then that means that the decisive majority must consist of both a) a majority of 314 votes and b) three
fifths of the overall number of votes cast. If the second method is adopted (the first limitation refers
to the quorum and the second to the majority required for the adoption of the Parliament’s decision)
then that means that it would be sufficient to have 314 Members of the Parliament present at the time
of the vote and, if all of them vote, then three fifths of the votes cast (ie 185 votes) will be enough to
adopt the decision. The problem is similar for Art. 272(8) [203(8)] according to the wording of
which, a majority of the Parliament’s Members and two thirds of the votes cast are sufficient for the
Parliament to reject the draft budget (Sopwith, op. cit., at 323). In that case, according to the first
method of calculation mentioned above (both limitations refer to the majority required for the
adoption of the decision), the decisive majority will consist of at least 314 votes and of two thirds of
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limitation refers to the necessary quorum while the second refers to the majority required for the
adoption of the decision), a quorum of 314 Member of Parliament is sufficient and if all those present
vote a majority of two thirds of the votes cast (ie 209 votes) is required to reject the draft budget. The
Council and the Commission consider the first method of calculation as more correct, arguing that if
the second method of calculation is accepted, then according to Art. 272(4) [ex 203(4)] the
Parliament can modify the non compulsory expenditure using obligatorily the absolute majority of its
Members (314 votes) while according to Art. 272(8) [ex 203(8)] referring to the rejection of the draft
budget -something much more important than amending the non compulsory expenditure- the
Parliament will need only a two thirds majority of the votes cast, which is 209 votes out of 314 votes
(since the first limitation would be considered to refer to the quorum). Consequently, rejecting the
draft budget would require less votes than simply amending it (Sopwith, op. cit., at 323-324). The
Parliament, nevertheless, has considered the second method of calculation of the votes as more
correct, and it has applied it, whenever the provisions in question were used. It seems that the
Parliament’s approach is more correct. The wording of the relevant provisions seems to refer first to
the quorum which will allow legally to the Parliament to adopt a decision and then to the percentage
of the votes required for the actual adoption of the decision (three fifths or two thirds, depending on
the provision used). That is the purpose of the use of different terms in the text of the provisions in
question, as at first the Treaty refers only the Member of the Parliament and afterwards it refers to the
votes cast. 
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III. The jurisdiction of the ECJ to review the budget 
The first question arising about the judicial review over the Budgetary Procedure is whether the ECJ
has any jurisdiction to review the budget or not. This question can be answered in both a political and
a legal context. 
The political context was put forward by Advocate General Mancini in his Opinion in Case 34/86. He
argued that it would be perilous to entrust the resolution of constitutional conflicts (such a conflict
within the framework of the Budgetary Procedure) to the judiciary, which already had excessive
powers within the Community’s institutional framework (Mancini, op. cit.) Also, in his view, any
judgments, which would effect the substance of the Budgetary procedure (he uses the example of the
ECJ applying by analogy Art. 231 [ex 174] of the EC Treaty to the Budgetary procedure after
annulling the parliamentary declaration of adopting the budget), would mean that the ECJ would
substitute itself for one of the institutions comprising the Budgetary Authority. This would promote
the ECJ to the rank of financial authority and would make credible all accusations against the ECJ
that it is practically a government of judges. (Mancini, op. cit., at 2185, para 17). 
The legal context was put forward by the ECJ itself in Case 34/86. The ECJ stated that it could not
intervene in the process of negotiation between the Council and the Parliament during the Budgetary
Procedure. It did not have to consider to what extent both institutions’ attitude prevented them from
reaching an agreement over the budget (Case 34/86, op. cit., at 2210-2211, paras 42 and 45). As it has
been pointed out, the ECJ has only to verify the conformity of the budgetary operations with the
provisions of the Treaty (Bazex, 1987, at 465). It is for the ECJ to ensure that the institutions
comprising the Budgetary Authority keep within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by
Community law (Case 34/86, op. cit., at 2210, para 42). More specifically it has to ensure that in the
context of the dialogue, the Institutions (Parliament – Council) do not ignore the rules of law and do
not exceed their discretionary power in a manifestly wrong or arbitrary way (Case 204/86, Greece v.
Council, [1988] ECR 5323 at 5339). 
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each other. It is politically incorrect to have a judicial institution involved substantively in financial
matters of constitutional nature such as the enactment of a budget, especially if this judicial
institution, like the ECJ, is accused of having excessive powers. However it is perfectly legal
(according to Community law) for the ECJ to examine whether the relevant procedural framework, as
prescribed by the Treaty, has been adhered to. It is a political responsibility for the Council and the
Parliament to behave in such a way that an agreement can be reached between them over the budget,
but the actual agreement is a requirement prescribed by Community law and the reaching of it can be
examined by the ECJ. Therefore the ECJ has jurisdiction to rule on disputes over the Union’s budget.
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IV. Legal basis of Judicial Review 
As for every case of judicial review within Community law, the legal basis of reviewing judicially the
Budgetary procedure is Art. 230 [ex 173] and 232 [ex 175] of the EC Treaty. With regard to the
provisions that will be used by the ECJ during this judicial review, they include mainly Art. 268 [ex
199] – 280 [ex 209a] of the EC Treaty, Articles 28 [ex J.18] and 41 [ex K.13] of the EU Treaty, the
provisions of the Financial Regulation regarding the enactment of the budget, and the various
interinstitutional agreements (Joint Declaration by the Community Institutions of 30 June 1982 on the
Community Budgetary Procedure, op. cit., Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and
Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure of 29 June 1988, op. cit., Interinstitutional Agreement on
Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure of 29 October 1993, OJ 1993, C
331/1) reached by the Council, the Parliament and the Commission about or during the Budgetary
procedure. 
V. Judicially Reviewable acts within the Budgetary Procedure 
The first aspect of judicial review of the Budgetary procedure concerns the acts that can be reviewed
by the ECJ. The provisions of Art. 230 [ex 173] of the EC Treaty stipulate that the reviewable acts
are the acts adopted jointly by the Parliament and the Council, the acts of the Council, the
Commission and the European Central Bank, and the acts of the European Parliament intended to
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.(1) Recommendations and opinions are not reviewable. 
Within the Budgetary Procedure there are several acts of the Council and the Parliament. The
preparatory measures such as the establishment and amendment of the draft budget have been found
not to be susceptible to annulment (Case 302/87, Parliament v. Council (“Comitology”), [1988] ECR
5615, para 23). Therefore the only reviewable act within the Budgetary procedure is the adoption of
the budget. This act has been examined in detail by Advocates General in cases regarding the budget.
Advocate General Mancini in his Opinion in Case 34/86 said that the budget is simply an accounting
document and the real reviewable act is the declaration of the Parliament’s President that the budget
has been adopted (Mancini, op. cit., at 2175, para 12). The budget, according to Mancini, is a
document annexed to the act, which promulgates it, the declaration of the President of the Parliament.
In order for the budget to create rights and obligations it has to be promulgated by the declaration of
its adoption. Mancini considers as erroneous the concept of the budget as an independent act, open to
challenge (Mancini, op. cit., at 2177, para 13). Advocate General La Pergola in his Opinion in Case
41/95 seems to have the same opinion. He argues that any claim against the budget itself is ancillary
to the principal claim, which should be addressed against the declaration of the Parliament’s
President (Advocate General La Pergola in Case 41/95, Council v. Parliament, [1995] ECR I-4411, at
4417-4418, paragraph 7). Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Case 284/90 takes a different
view (Advocate General Jacobs in Case 284/90, Council v. Parliament, [1992] ECR I-2277 at 2279).
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distinction between the Parliament’s act to adopt the budget and the declaration of the Parliament’s
President that this adoption has taken place (Jacobs, op. cit., at 2317-2318, para 71). He
acknowledges that the budget does not become legally binding until the declaration of the
Parliament’s President is made, but he suggests that an act can be the object of an action for
annulment, even if a further condition must be fulfilled before the act can begin to have legal effects
(Jacobs, op. cit., at 2317, para 63). Therefore, in his opinion, in order to annul the declaration of the
budget’s adoption, it is necessary to annul first the adoption of the budget itself (Jacobs, op. cit., at
2318, para 73). 
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This latter opinion of Jacobs is more convincing. The budget, as mentioned above, cannot be
considered as a mere document containing financial forecasts. A budget is not only a financial
statement, or a method of financial assumptions and forecasts, or a system of controlling expenditure,
or an decision-making instrument, or a report aiming to the economic and financial development of a
country, but all of the above (Lee, Johnson, 1973, at 2). Even in the definition of the Financial
Regulation [Art. 1(1)] the budget is an instrument, which sets out forecasts of, and authorises in
advance, the expected revenue and expenditure of the Communities for each year, so it has
authorizing powers. Therefore its adoption must be considered as an independent act that can be
individually challenged before the ECJ. The ECJ however seems to adopt another point of view,
approaching more the opinions of Advocates General Mancini and La Pergola. In the Court’s opinion
the annulment of the declaration of the Parliament’s President will deprive the budget of its validity,
therefore there is no need to examine the act of adoption itself (Case 34/86, op. cit., at 2211, para 46,
Case 284/90, op. cit., at 2326, para 12, Case 41/95, op. cit., at 4440, para 41). The Court avoids
examining whether the act of the budget’s adoption is reviewable and it seems satisfied with the fact
that if it reviews the declaration of adoption, it can produce a judgement without having to examine
any other action. 
This approach of the Court does not seem correct. In order to prove that, the question of who actually
adopts the budget must be examined first. The ECJ has pointed out that the budget is adopted only by
the Parliament (Case 302/87, op. cit., at 5643, para 24). Advocate General La Pergola compared the
co-decision procedure of Art. 251 [ex 189b] of the EC Treaty with the Budgetary Procedure and
emphasized that while in the co-decision procedure the adopted measure is signed by the Presidents
of both the Council and the Parliament, in the Budgetary procedure the declaration of the adoption of
the budget is made only by the Parliament’s President (La Pergola, op. cit., at 4427, para 21). These
opinions however overlook the fact that the Council and the Parliament cooperate closely during the
Budgetary Procedure. The Council has also the final say about the compulsory expenditure. A careful
examination of the wording of Art. 272 [ex 203] proves that the budget is adopted by both
institutions. It is stated in Art. 272(6) [ex 203(6)]: “…the European Parliament…shall adopt the
budget…”, but half of the expenditure section of this budget is determined by the Council.
Additionally, according to Art 272(4), (5) and (6) [ex 203(4), (5) and (6)], the budget is considered
adopted after either the Council or the Parliament have not amended the draft budget sent to them
after a certain period of time. This demonstrates that the Treaty considers both institutions equally
involved in the adoption (not only the drawing) of the budget. The Council is as much substantively
involved in the Budgetary Procedure as the Parliament. Consequently, the adoption being a joint act
of the Council and the Parliament, it is reviewable according to Art. 230 [ex 173] of the EC Treaty. It
must be pointed out of course that only the adoption itself (as a separate act-see above) is considered
a joint act of the Council and the Parliament. The declaration of the budget’s adoption (which gives
the budget its legal effects(2)) is of course an act of the Parliament’s President. The practical result of
this reasoning is that the decision of the budget’s adoption is a reviewable act. The declaration of the
Parliament’s President is a part of the adoption’s publication (the other being the publication of the
6 of 12 19.06.00 17:31
EIoP: Text 2000-007: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-007.htmbudget in the Official Journal). As with any legislative or administrative act which produces its legal
effects upon publication, the budget’s adoption produces its legal effects after the declaration and the
publication in the Official Journal. And as any legislative or administrative act can be challenged
after its publication, the budget’s adoption can be challenged after the declaration of the Parliament’s
President and the adoption’s publication in the Official Journal. It must be noted that when
challenging a legislative or administrative act, the actual challenge refers to the adoption of the act,
not the publication. Accordingly, when challenging the budget, the challenge should refer to its
adoption and not the declaration of the Parliament’s President, which is a part (indeed important) of
the budget’s publication procedure. 
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With regard to omissions during the Budgetary Procedure, there are some discrepancies from what is
generally accepted about failures to act under Community law. In general, it is has been
acknowledged that omissions reviewable under Art. 232 [ex 175] of the EC Treaty are the failures to
adopt reviewable acts in the sense of Art. 230 [ex 173] (Craig, De Búrca, op. cit., at 491). Within the
framework of the Budgetary procedure however this seems problematic. It has been stated above that
the only reviewable acts in this procedure are the adoption of the budget and the declaration of its
adoption. Failing to adopt the budget or to declare its adoption cannot happen unless the delay of
these two acts is such that could be assimilated to omission. According to Art. 232 [ex 175] the time
after which a delay can be considered failure to act is two months after the institution concerned has
been called upon to act. Given that the provisions of the Budgetary procedure include specific time
limits for the adoption of the budget, it must be accepted, by applying the principle lex specialis
derogat lex generalis, that these latter time limits must be used in order to determine whether there
has been any failure to act by any of the institutions involved. 
The situation is more complicated with regard to the preparatory acts (establishment and amendment
of draft budget) of the Budgetary procedure. It was noted above that these are not reviewable acts.
However, because of the importance of the budgetary procedure, it could be argued that the failure to
perform these acts in time would delay dangerously the adoption of the budget. Such a delay may be
very hazardous for the operation of the European Union, despite the fact that there is Art. 273 [ex
204] of the EC Treaty regulating this case (Pipkom, 1981, at 141-167). A more complete picture of
the situation is possible, if someone considers that there are no sanctions for the institution that does
not act in time during the budgetary procedure. Therefore, the ECJ could review such delays, even if
they concern non reviewable acts, and oblige the institution to act. That, after all, would be nothing
more than a method of enforcement of Art. 272(10) [ex 203(10)] of the EC Treaty which states that
every institution involved in the Budgetary procedure shall exercise its powers with due regard to the
provisions of the Treaty. The ECJ has allowed the Parliament to challenge the failure of the Council
to adopt a draft budget, which itself it is not a reviewable act (Case 302/87, op. cit., at 5641 para 16). 
VI. Standing in Judicial Review of acts in the Budgetary
Procedure 
According to the second paragraph of Art. 230 [ex 173] of the EC Treaty the Member States, the
Council and the Commission are always allowed to bring an action before the ECJ. Consequently
there is no doubt of their standing to challenge an act adopted during the Budgetary procedure. 
With regard to the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank, it is
stipulated in the third paragraph of Art. 230 [ex 173] that they can bring actions before the ECJ in
order to protect their prerogatives (see Case 70/88, Parliament v. Council (“Chernobyl”), [1990]
ECR I-2041). For the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank, the budgetary procedure is
7 of 12 19.06.00 17:31
EIoP: Text 2000-007: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-007.htminteresting to the extent that its outcome, the budget, is affecting their operations, mainly through the
appropriations about the administrative expenses of these institutions. 
8
The Parliament, however, being one branch of the Budgetary Authority, is much more interested and
involved in the Budgetary procedure. Therefore its prerogatives are most likely to be influenced
during this procedure. In general it has been accepted that if a party has the ability to have an input in
the making of a decision, it makes sense for this party to challenge this decision before the ECJ
(Craig, De Búrca, op. cit., at 487). Arguing, for instance that its views, although listened in a formal
sense, were in fact disregarded, is a reasonable argument on which to base an action against this
decision. Since the Council has the final say about a substantial part of the budget’s appropriations
(those regarding compulsory expenditure), it is possible to affect the Parliament’s prerogatives. The
most obvious case would be for the Council not to consult the Parliament in establishing the
compulsory expenditure by simply not taking into substantive consideration the Parliament's point of
view. The right of the Parliament to be consulted properly, in accordance with the provision of the
Treaties (or any other legislative provision such as the various interinstitutional agreements on
budgetary procedure) has been found to be one of its prerogatives (Case 316/91, Parliament v.
Council, [1994] ECR I-653, at 659, paragraphs 16-17). The problem arising however is that since the
preparatory acts in the Budgetary procedure cannot be challenged, it would be difficult for the
Parliament, despite its standing to challenge such an act of the Council. A possible solution to such a
problem will be analyzed in the following section. 
It is difficult to see the so called “non privileged” applicants (natural and legal persons) bringing an
action against an act adopted in the Budgetary procedure. First of all, these applicants have no
involvement in the Budgetary procedure. The budget itself does not meet the first requirement of the
fourth paragraph of Art. 230 [ex 173] since it is not addressed to any person. Also, even though the
budget’s contents may eventually effect several people (either through the provisions about revenue
which involve sums paid by European taxpayers or through the provisions about expenditure which
involve sums given to all kinds of final beneficiaries), it is very difficult for someone to establish that
he is directly and individually concerned. The test used to establish individual concern in included in
the ECJ’s judgement at the Plaumann case (Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v Commission, [1963] ECR
95). According to that (at p 107) 
“Persons…may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by
reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in
which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors
distinguishes them inidividually…” 
Furthermore, the general rule for direct concern is that if a Member State is granted any discretion to
act under the disputed provisions, then the provision by its nature cannot give rise to direct concern
(Case 41-44/70, NV International Fruit Company v. Commission, [1971] ECR 411, at 422-423, paras
25-28). In addition, it has been found (although in the context of Community liability under Art. 288
of the EC Treaty) that if the Community institutions have been granted broad discretion to act, then
the applicants cannot claim that the provisions granting this discretion, concern them directly (Case
T-113/96, Édouard Dubois et Fils v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities, [1998] ECR II-125, at II-146, II-147, paras 59-66). By applying these criteria
to the provisions of the Budgetary procedure, it can be established that the requirements of Art.
230(4) [ex 173(4)] are not met. The same conclusion is reached of these criteria are applied to the
budget itself. No provision of the budget is distinguishing a person individually (either by obliging
this person to contribute to the revenue of the Union or by granting to this person the right to claim
money from the Union’s expenditure). Also the budget is implemented mainly by the Commission
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VII. Grounds of Judicial Review 
According to Art. 230 [ex 173] of the EC Treaty, there are four reasons, which can be put forward to
order to have an act annulled by the ECJ: lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its applications and misuse of
powers. 
The competences of the institutions during the Budgetary procedure are clearly stipulated by the
provisions of Art. 272 [ex 203] of the EC Treaty, therefore no problems can be raised regarding the
first ground for annulment. 
The Budgetary procedure, having a purely procedural nature, could provide several opportunities of
invoking the second ground for annulment, the infringement of an essential procedural requirement.
However, it must be pointed out once more that the preparatory acts of the Budgetary procedure
cannot be challenged before the ECJ. Such a limitation does not leave too much margin for invoking
this ground of judicial review. The fact that the infringement of an essential procedural requirement
cannot be invoked for the review of preliminary acts of the Budgetary procedure demonstrates even
more the importance of the above suggested alternative of the ECJ reviewing omissions (or extreme
delays) of these preliminary acts. It must be said however that in case that the final act (adoption or
declaration of adoption of the budget) is challenged, the infringement of a procedural requirement
during the preparatory act stage can be used in the arguments of the challenge. When a final act is
challenged, all the non reviewable preparatory acts are considered to be challenged with it. 
The third ground of judicial review is the most general of all. It covers every violation of the Treaties
and any law relating to their application. This ground of annulment can provide a solution of the
above identified problem that the Parliament, despite having legal standing, cannot challenge the
Council’s preliminary acts during the Budgetary procedure for not having considered properly the
former’s opinion about the compulsory expenditure of the Union. The solution is that the Parliament
could challenge the adoption of the budget (made jointly by itself and the Council), claiming that the
Council, during the Budgetary procedure, violated its obligation under Art. 272 [ex 203] of the EC
Treaty and the various interinstitutional agreements on Budgetary procedure.(3) Since the compulsory
expenditure is set by the Council, the Parliament could challenge the adoption as to that part of the
budget. Such an action should be found admissible by the Court because it would be put forward by
an institution having legal standing, it would be addressed against a reviewable act (as established
above) and it would include a valid reason for annulment. Whether the action would be successful in
its substance depends of course on the actual facts. If it is successful, the ECJ can annul the adoption
of the budget and, in order not to interfere furthermore in the Budgetary Procedure as established in
the section about its jurisdiction, it will ask the Council and the Parliament to renegotiate the
compulsory expenses section of the budget. Finally it will declare all transactions till that moment to
be valid, as it has done so far by using its power according to Art. 231 [ex 174] (Case 34/86, op. cit.,
at 2213, para 51, Case 41/95, op. cit., at 4441, para 45). 
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suggestion to consider the budget jointly adopted by the Parliament and the Council. If the adoption
of the budget was considered an act only of Parliament and the Parliament wished to challenge it, that
would be impossible since the Parliament could not challenge one of its own acts or an act of its
President ie the declaration of adoption (Jacobs, op. cit., at 2314, para 60). The Parliament could not
rely upon the Commission bringing an action against the adoption of the budget since the
Commission and the Parliament do not always agree on issues over the budget. And since the
preparatory acts would be non reviewable, that would lead to a situation where, during the Budgetary
Procedure, the Council could make errors which could not be rectified or challenged by the
Parliament. At the same time though the Council would be perfectly capable of challenging the
Parliament’s acts (adoption of budget, declaration of adoption). Such an outcome would not be a
satisfactory distribution of powers between the two branches of the Budgetary Authority (Jacobs, op.
cit., at 2315, para 60). 
The fourth ground of annulment, the misuse of powers, involving not only legal but also political
aspects, can be invoked if one of the institutions involved in the Budgetary procedure is found to use
its competences to achieve an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically
prescribed by the Treaties for enacting the measure in question (Case 84/94, United Kingdom v.
Council (“Working time Directive”), [1996] ECR I-5755, at 5814, para 69), here the budget. An
example would be for the Parliament to reject constantly the draft budget, since it can do that
according to Art. 272 (8) [ex 203 (8)], in order to oblige the Council to accept its views. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The budget is one of the major instruments of European integration. Its structure and contents
(drawing of revenue, allocation of expenditure) form a “global expression” of the political and
financial ideology of the European Union (Ioakimidis, 1988, at 45). It is therefore the trial field of the
balance between the institutions (Ioakimidis, op. cit., at 46), because of the different levels of
political sensitivity demonstrated by these institutions with regard to the various community issues
(Seremetis, 1995, at 318). Consequently, the judicial review of the Budgetary Procedure is the
safeguard that this Procedure will operate properly, maintaining the necessary institutional balances.
The suggestions put forward above aim to be a step towards this direction. The equality between both
branches of the Budgetary Authority along with their joint competence (and consequently
responsibility) over the adoption of the budget, is perhaps the safest method to avoid conflicts which
could endanger the integrating process, as this process is carried forward through the activities
financed by the Union’s budget. However, amending the relevant legislative provisions alone cannot
solve the problem. The legislative provisions have been characterized as a mask behind which a
different reality exists (Kapteyn, Verloren van Themaat, op. cit., at 374). This reality is the practice
created during the implementation of these provisions. Only if the institutions involved in the
relevant proceedings maintain good contacts and try to find solutions for continually recurring
problems, is there a possibility for the complex budgetary procedure to work properly. 
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Endnotes
(*) The author wishes to thank Professor Rosa Greaves, Professor Laurence Gormley and the referees
of EIoP for their comments.
(1) Before the EU Treaty, the acts of Parliament were not mentioned in Art. 230 (ex 173) of the EC
Treaty. The ECJ however had ruled in the Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v. Parliament,
[1986] ECR 1339 that it could review the acts of the Parliament.
(2) The ECJ in its judgement on Case 34/86, op. cit., at 2201, paragraph 6, ruled that the budget, after
the declaration of the Parliament’s President on its adoption, produces legal effects because of its
nature as an instrument of setting out forecasts and authorizing in advance revenue and expenditure.
Also the Joint Declaration of 1982 on the Community Budgetary procedure included an agreement of
the participating institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament) that the utilization of appropriations
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EIoP: Text 2000-007: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-007.htmfor significant Community action required a legal basis independent of the budget, while less
important measures could be implemented directly on the basis of the budget. See P. Dankert, op. cit.,
at 709. This indicates that even when an additional legal basis is deemed necessary, the budget is
always a basis for all Community measures.
(3) These agreements have been acknowledged as very important legislative instruments which even
though they do not supplement the provisions of the Treaty, they serve to implement them. See
Jacobs, op. cit., at 4427, paragraph 21. The legislative nature of such agreements, that are not
mentioned explicitly by the Treaties, has been examined by Mönar, 1998, at 698-700, who considers
them sui generis acts, having a legal status somewhere “in between” a political undertaking and a
legal obligation. Usually they described by the term “soft law”. He states that especially the
agreements on budgetary discipline, because of their form and content, are on the edge between “hard
law” and “soft law”. Mancini, op. cit., at 2178, para 14 and La Pergola, op. cit., at 4422, paras 14-15
claim that only these agreements must be used in order to distinguish between compulsory and non
compulsory expenses expenditure, and that the Court should refrain from establishing itself such
criteria.
©2000 by Skiadas
formated and tagged by MN, 19.6.2000
12 of 12 19.06.00 17:31
EIoP: Text 2000-007: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-007.htm